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1
Suchterms as "budget flexibility" and "built-in stabilizers" have
come to be accepted currency in economic discussions, particularly
in the purchase of freedom from recession. As often as not, how-
ever, the currency engraving is fuzzy and ill defined. And, most
generally, the currency circulates without established values.
The study reported on here attempts, first, to disclose and meas-
ure those segments of federal budget revenue and expenditure
programs which are flexible and which change automatically in
response to changes in gross national expenditures and income: that
is, built-in movements within previously defined programs, as op-
posed to changes in programs that require explicit, new 'adminis-
trative or legislative action. Second, estimates are made of the extent
to which these induced budget changes act as stabilizers, in that
they, in turn, have a repercussive, determining influence on the
amount of change in gross national income and expenditures.1
2
Thebroad method used is suggested by the purpose of the
study. A clearly defined federal budget, with all its attendant reve-
nue and expenditure programs, was established, and definite pat-
terns and rates of economic change were postulated.
1. When the study began, there was some uncertainty as to
This paper draws on a number of basic studies and estimates contributed by
Benjamin Caplan, Sam Cohn, Thomas Leahey, Robert Masucci, Karl Nygaard,
Louis Paradiso, and Carl Winegarden. The paper has benefited, especially, from
suggestions made by Mr. Caplan. The treatment of the subject, however, is the
responsibility of the author alone, and does not necessarily reflect the views of the
organization with which he is associated.
'In order to identify the flexible components of the federal budget and to
estimate their degree of flexibility and stabilizing effectiveness with the greatest
possible thoroughness and accuracy, it has been necessary to use rather elaborate
assumptions, procedures, and calculations. These details, clearly relevant to an
appreciation of the estimates, cannot be dealt with here in any extended form.
This paper must of necessity be little more than a partial summary of the study
and its findings.
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how the federal tax system would be altered. It was decided to use
the then-existing tax law with certain modifications recommended
by the President on May 20, 1953; namely, that:
a. The excess-profits tax would be removed on January 1, 1954
b. The reduction in the regular corporate tax rate from 52 to 47
per cent, scheduled to go into effect on April 1, 1954, would
be rescinded
c. The reductions in excise taxes, which would take place April
1, 1954 under present law, would be rescinded pending the de-
velopment of a better system of excise taxation
This modified tax system was assumed to continue in effect
through fiscal years 1954 and 1955.
2. On the expenditure side, the programs contained in the August
27 review of the 1954 budget were taken for fiscal 1954. In the ab-
sence pf an official budget for fiscal 1955, we arbitrarily settled on
an expenditure level of $66 billion. These expenditures were re-
garded as taking place under conditions of an expanding high-
employment economy, with prices stable at the level of the first
half of 1953.
3. The revenue and expenditure estimates, translated into na-
tional income account equivalents, were incorporated in three
models of gross.national product designed to trace high-employment,
moderate downturn, and recession conditions. In the case of the
last two models the government revenue and expenditure estimates
were adjusted to reflect the postulated economic conditions. The
adjustments, however, were regarded only as first approximations
to the induced movement of revenues and expenditures. These com-
prehensive models served as the basis for more exhaustive and ac-
curate estimates of revenues and expenditures. The models, in turn,
were then recast to include the more accurate estimates àf govern-
ment transactions, and to reconcile all other expenditure and income
calculations.
4. Flexible expenditure programs were defined and classified as
follows:
a. Appropriations or major programs in which changes in ex-
penditures could occur without requiring either action by Con-
gress or the exercise of administrative discretion. This type of
flexibility is exemplified by permanent, indefinite appropria-
tions, such as interest on the public debt, expenditures from
the social insurance trust funds, and programs in which sup-
pliers could change delivery schedules for goods under con-
tract.
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b. Programs which would require supplemental appropriations
by Congress in order to carry out expenditure commitments
made under existing policies and enabling legislation. It was
assumed that such additional authorizations would be enacted
to meet the requirements resulting from additional case loads
or other factors in "open-end" programs, such as public as-
sistance grants to states and veterans' pension and readjustment
benefits.
c. Programs financed by public debt authorizations, whether or
not additional borrowing authority would be required to make
expenditures under existing policies and enabling legislation.
It was assumed that additional authorizations would be made
as required. This applies to farm price support operations
(Commodity Credit Corporation) and to the mortgage pur-
chase program (Federal National Mortgage Association).
d. Programs in which changes could occur as a result of ad-
ministrative discretion, to the extent that funds were available
without further Congressional action. This would include a
speedup in letting contracts, an increase in the rate of construc-
tion on river, harbor, and reclamation projects, or other changes
in existing policies (including policies mentioned in b and c
above).
e. Programs in which expenditure levels could be changed by
changes in the prices of goods and services purchased.
5. The gross national product models were not derived from
any fixed set of economic relationships, but were built up on a
step-by-step judgment basis. In the case of the recession model, we
attempted to surmise just how the general economy and its com-
ponents might move, time- and amplitudewise, and what other
characteristics the recessionary development might have. This was
done, however, with the fullest possible regard to past experience
and relationships and to the peculiarities of the economy at the
onset of the hypothetical recession. It cannot be stressed too strongly
that all models are regarded as purely hypothetical parts of a tech-
nical study, and not in any way as suggesting possible future de-
velopments. The more basic assumptions and characteristics of the
recession model are:
a. Unemployment is assumed to reach 8.0 million over a two-
year period.
b. Labor force growth is assumed to slow down, with a net re-
duction in the participation rates of teen-agers, elderly men,
and adult women. The labor force, at the end of two years, is
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put at 68]. million, compared with 67.2 million in the first
half of 1953.
c. Farm employment is assumed to rise from 6.3 to 6.8 million
farm workers.
d. Factory hours fall about 5 hours to a below-standard work-
week (i.e. from 41.0 to 35.9 hours) and overtime virtually
disappears. The private nonf arm workweek is assumed to fall
3.2 hours (from 39.8 to 36.6 hours).
e. The growth in private nonfarm product per man-hour is kept
at about .5 per cent per year (i.e. from an index of 100.0 to
101.8 in two years).
f. Despite sharply decreased hours of work, the foregoing as-
sumptions entail a net reduction of 5.7 million private nonfarm
jobs (from 49.1 to 43.4 million).
g. The consumer price index is assumed to show an average de-
cline of %percent per month, or an over-all 9 per cent de-
cline for the two-year period. The post-1929 fall was at the
rate of .5 per cent per month during the first 24 months.
h. Wholesale prices are assumed to fall at a rate 1% times that
of retail prices, or 12 per cent over the two-year period. The
post-1929 fall in wholesale prices was at twice the rate of
consumer prices.
i. Farm prices are assumed to fall 14 per cent over the period..
j.Privatewages and salaries per man-hour are assumed to fall
at half the rate of consumer prices.
k. Corporate profits plus inventory valuation adjustment are as-
sumed to move with the private nonf arm gross national
product, at a marginal rate of roughly one-fourth.
1. At the onset of the recession, dividends are less than one-half
of corporate profits after taxes. They are assumed to rise to
about three-quarters of profits by the end of the period.
The personal saving rate, out of disposable income, is assumed
to fall to roughly 4.0 per cent.
n. Farm and government gross products were estimated sepa-
rately, and added to the private nonfarm gross product, de-
rived on the basis of the assumptions listed above, to yield a
total gross national product.
o. Personal consumption expenditures were estimated from an
income account consistent with the estimated gross national
product and other assumptions listed.
p. With estimated government and consumer expenditures, gross
investmentoutlayswere. obtained,residually.Inventory
80EFFECTiVENESS OF BUDGET FLEXIBiLITY
changes were estimated on the assumption of keeping the
ratio of total inventories to sales or gross nonf arm product
roughly the same as in the first half of 1953. The remaining
sum of gross private domestic investment was distributed over
construction and producers' durable goods on what appeared
to be a most reasonable basis.
8
The concept of flexibility in budget revenue and expenditure pro-
grams can be clearly and meaningfully defined in a number of al-
ternative forms. It may be expressed as the amount of induced, abso-
lute dollar change in a given revenue or expenditure program
following an absolute dollar change in some external variable, such
as gross national expenditures. Alternatively, it may be measured
in elasticity terms: the percentage change in revenue, for example,
relative to a percentage change in gross national expenditures. Or
budget flexibility may be stated in terms of change in the average
effective tax rate in response to a change in the external variable.
Similarly, the notion of the stabilizing influence of budget flexi-
bility can be given reasonably clear alternative definitions. But
these alternatives include arbitrary elements and differences in
meaningfulness which make the selection of one definition a matter
of some moment. In testing the stabilizing effectiveness of flexibility,
the calculation is basically in terms of what the gross national ex-
penditure level would be with a given budget flexibility, as com-
pared with what the level would be in the absence of the given flexi-
bility, or with some other degree of flexibility. This, however, at once
suggests measurement against some assumed bench-mark dependent
upon the definition of flexibility employed. To illustrate with the
case of revenue flexibility, the test involves comparing gross na-
tional expenditures under the actual tax system with what such ex-
penditures would be if some other, hypothetical tax system were
in existence.
Thus the income or expenditure level obtained with an actual
tax system may be compared with the income level that would re-
sultunder a hypothetical tax system designed to keep total revenues
completely unchanged or inflexible. In terms of the alternative defi-
nitions of flexibility described above, this hypothetical tax system
would have zero absolute, zero elasticity, and perverse effective-
rate flexibility in response to changes in the external variable. An-
other hypothetical tax system may be one in which the average ef-
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fective tax rate remains unchanged with changes in income. That
is,effective-rate flexibility is zero, absolute flexibility is positive,
and elasticity flexibility is equal to one.
Instead of using such hypothetical tax systems as bench-marks
for testing the stabilizing effectiveness of the present tax system,
it has been suggested that some other actual tax system, such as
that in effect in 1929, or 1937, or 1948, might. be used as a bench-
mark. Some technical difficulties arise in this sort of calculation,
but, more important, the approach involves a conceptual difficulty
which militates against its use. Apart from differing general levels
of economic activity, which is a relevant consideration, the struc-
tural and interrelationship pattern of an economy is clearly in-
fluenced or shaped by the particular, existing tax system. It seems
awkward, at the least, to place the present tax system, for exam-
ple, into the economic environment of 1929, which was shaped
in some degree by the actual tax system of that year.
The bench-mark used in this study is that given by assuming zero
effective-rate flexibility, which is equivalent to the unit elasticity
flexibility of a proportional tax system. That is, the stabilizing ef-
fectiveness of the present tax system is tested by comparison with
what, say, the effect on income would be if tax revenues changed in
direct proportion to changes in gross national income.
The detailed, precise definition of stabilizing effectiveness used
here is most readily givenalgebraic form.
With all values expressed in current prices, let
Y =grossnational expenditures or income
Cconsumption expenditures
I =investmentexpenditures
G =programedgovernment expenditures for goods and serv-
ices
C1 =flexiblegovernment expenditures for goods and services
=personaldisposal income
R =totaltax revenues
T =governmenttransfer payments; broadly interpreted to in-
clude interest and subsidies minus current surplus of gov-
ernment enterprises
=businesssavings; including capital consumption allow-
ance, undistributed corporate profits, corporate inventory
valuation adjustment, excess of wage accruals over dis-
bursements, and the statistical discrepancy
(1) Y=C+I+G+G1
(2) Yd=Y—R+T—Sb
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(8) C=a+c(Y—R+T—Sb)
where c =marginalrate of change in consumer expenditures rela-
tive to disposable income
a =constantin the consumption function
Setting
R =rY where r is the average effective tax rate, measured
as the ratio of revenues to gross national income
T =tY where t is the ratio of transfer payments to gross
national income
Sb=d+sY
G, =gYwhere g is the ratio of flexible government ex-





The initial gross national expenditure, before a change in invest-
ment and/or programed government expenditures, would be
6)Y — a—cd+11+C1
11—c(1—r1+t1—s)—g1




where the change in "autonomous" expenditures induces a change
in r, t, and g. If r, t, and g are assumed to remain unchanged, the
hypothetical gross national expenditure would be
— a—cd+12+G2
() 121—c(1—r1+t1—s)
The actual change in gross national expenditures would be Y1—
If the average rates r, t, and g had zero flexibility, the hypo-
thetical change would be Y1 — And,the difference between
the hypothetical and actual changes may be expressed in the form
(Y1—Y12)—(Y1—Y2)=Y2—Y12
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This difference, the amount of further change in expenditures
which is prevented by the built-in flexibility other than zero, may
be measured relative to (a) the original level of expenditures
y2—y12
yl








This last, which shows the degree to which the built-in flexibility
offsets the change in investment and/or programed expenditures, is









the stabilizing effectiveness of built-in flexibility, or the degree to
which automatic flexibility offsets a change in investment and/or
programed government expenditures, is shown by
(11) 2[
Thisexpression is identified as coefficient of stabilizing
flexibility, or the flexibility offset to change in investment and/or
2Thisis equivalent to the measurement used by Richard A. Musgrave and
Merton H. Miller in their article on "Built-in Flexibility" (American Economic
Review, March 1948, pp. 122—128). In that article, which deals essentially with
revenue flexibility, the hypothetical decline is taken as that associated with a tax
system which has zero absolute and elasticity flexibility, rather than zero effective-
rate flexibility, assumed here. The relation between the two approaches is shown
in the appendix to this paper.
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programed government expenditures. The coefficient has boundary.
values of zero, when there is no change in the sum of average rates;
and one, for perfect stabilizing flexibility or offset. Negative values
may also be obtained, reflecting destabilizing or perverse flexi-
bility.
In the case of a fall in investment and/or programed govern-
ment expenditures, a decrease in the average tax rate and increases
in the average transfer and flexible government expenditure rates
(measured relative to gross national income) provide offsets to the
deflationary change in outlays.
4
As is apparent from equation 11, separate, additive subcoeffi-
cients of stabilizing flexibility can be calculated for the tax, trans-
fer, and expenditure programs; and for components within, each
major program. The preliminary estimates available at this time are
presented in Table 1. Coefficients are shown for haff yearly changes
in the recession model, for successive yearly changes in the period
1929—1932, and for the 1937—1938 change. All government expendi-
tures for goods and services, in the latter historical periods, were
taken as programed.
Though the figures are still tentative, their general magnitudes
are probably accurate enough to permit evaluations; however, we
are unable to undertake this evaluation in the present paper. This
deficiency is partially remedied by the comments that follow.
Appendix.
The relation between theapproachused here and that employed
by Musgrave and Miller may be shown asfollows:
Summarizing the Musgrave and Miller method, using their no-
tation and equation numbering,
(1)
"The income elasticity (E) of the tax yield (T) is"
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Substituting r1for
1—c(1—Er1)
"As a convenient measure for the compensatory effectiveness of
'built-in flexibility' we may then write
(5) a1—
whererefers to the change in income in the particular tax system
under discussion (with its specific positive value for Er1) and
refers to a system where (E) is set equal to zero.
Substituting equation 4 in equation 5,
'6' —1 1—c — cEr1
/ a—1—c(1—Er1)1—c+cEr1
Continuingnow to establish the relation between the above ap-
proach and that used here, equation 2 may be stated as
(7\ E— —r2Y2
— 1+ '' — r1Y1
so that
(8)
If nowis taken to refer to changes in income in a particular
tax system with a flexible average effective rate (i.e.has a value
other than zero), and refers to a system where E1 or










which,from equation 4, is
(11)
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whereis clearly less than a.
Thechange in the government deficit associated with the flexi-
bility offsets may be shown in the following manner:
The government surplus (S) may be defined as
(1) S=R—(C+G,+T)
(2)
which can be expressed in the form
(3)AS=S1AY+AsY2 =(r1AY+ ArY2) —(n1AY+ AnY2)
—(g1AY+ AgY2) —(t1AY +
where s and n are the ratios of the surplus and nonflexible govern-
ment expenditures, respectively, to gross national expenditures.
Equation 3 can be written as
(4)
+ (r1—t1—g1—n1)
If S1 =0,s1 =0,and r1 g1—n1=0,so that
(5) AS=ASY2=Y2(Ar—At—Ag—An)
then with a decline in gross national product, a decrease in r
(Ar = r2>0) and increases in t,g,and n (At= t1—t2 <0;
Ag<0; and< 0) reduce the government surplus or increase
the deficit.
Let F =Y2[c(Ar —At)—Ag], whichis the offset to the decline
in investment and/or programed expenditures (A(I+ G) in equa-






with a decline in expenditures.
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COMMENT
SAMUEL M. COHN, Bureau of the Budget
Lusher's interesting paper provides one possible measure of
"budget flexibility"—a measure of the offset provided by "built-in
stabilizers" to programed declines in investment and government
purchases. The estimates he provides formeasuringthe stabiliz-
ing effectiveness of built-in budget flexibility, are indeed interesting,
and provide a base from which further analysis could lead to policy
conclusions and decisions.
However, these estimates ofand the conclusions derived can
be no better than the underlying data and the estimates which were
made to measure the responsiveness of the federal budget to as-
sumed changes in economic activity.
The study of budget responsiveness that provides the basic figures
for Lusher's paper includes only those government programs for
which federal receipts or expenditures would change appreciably
with a change in economic activity. In other words, it excludes the
effects of government programs which do not currently influence
the federal budget; for example, bank deposit insurance, mortgage
insurance, savings and loan insurance, and loan guarantee programs.
It also excludes the economic effects of a flexible monetary policy.
In summary, therefore, we have examined the changes in receipts
and disbursements of the federal government which would occur
with certain assumed changes in the economy, without adding any
new antirecession programs. Estimates of the changes in some gov-
ernment programs were relatively easy to make. In other cases,
however, many auxiliary assumptions and judgments were neces-
sary, and these assumptions and judgments—although reasonable
—are certainly debatable. I shall try to mention the important ones
as I describe the estimates.
First, however, several general observations are in order. The
estimatesmy discussion are based on fiscal years; thus the fiscal
year 1958 is the year that ended on June 30, 1953. They have to
do with the federal budget, and are conceptually different from
the income and product accounts of the federal sector which form
the basis for Lusher's calculations.. For example, my revenue esti-
mates are in terms of collections and therefore lag the tax liabili-
The estimates and opinions presented are my judgments and are not necessarily
the same as those of!3ureau of the Budget.
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ties(accruals)which are included in the income and product statis-
tics. It is by looking at the federal budget, rather than the national
income accounts, that we can obtain a background against which
political and administrative decisions would have to be made in
response to various kinds of economic change. Quantitative changes
in the federal budget are computed in terms of the consolidated
cash statement, or receipts from and payments to the public. At
the end of the discussion I shall reconcile the figures to show the
change in the deficit of the conventional or so-called administrative
budget.
My discussion will be limited to the fiscal year which Lusher has
called, in quotation marks, 1955. Institutionally, present laws and
government programs pretty much tie down the period of time to
the actual fiscal year 1955. Lusher described the assumptions we
made with respect to changes in present tax laws and with respect
to the total of budget expenditures. Within limits, other assumptions
could be made which might be just as reasonable. On the expendi-
ture side of the budget, however, the limits are such that other rea-
sonable assumptions for the fiscal year 1955 would not have ap-
preciably altered the dollar estimate of the change in government
expenditures due to the assumed change in economic conditions.
In discussing the change in the cash surplus (or deficit) resulting
from the assumed change in economic conditions, I shall group the
federal programs involved into five categories. These categories
indicate differences in the degree to which the budgetary changes
are really "built-in," and also indicate differences in the kinds of
judgments which must be made in preparing the estimates. The
five categories are (1) truly automatic changes—those occurring
without the necessity for any executive or legislative decisions; (2)
changes arising from needed supplemental appropriations—here
executive and legislative decisions are required, but the area of
discretion is very limited; (3) changes arising in programs financed
by public debt authority—mostly government enterprises—where
market conditions make for special problems; (4) changes resulting
from price declines, and here very definite administrative decisions
are required; (5) changes which can be accomplished by adminis-
trative discretion—within already appropriated funds and with-
out changing program objectives—the administrative decisions re-
quired here might be more difficult to make than those in the fourth
category.
In total the estimates show that under the assumed recession con-
ditions the consolidated cash deficit for the fiscal year 1955 might be
91Summary of Changes in Cash SurplusIDeilcit between Expanding Economy
and Recession, Year 1955"
(billions of dollars)
Increase in Cash
Category Surplus (+) or Deficit (—)
1. Automatic —19.2
2. Supplemental appropriation requirements —1.2
3. Programs financed by public debt authorizations —2.7
4. Effect of price declines +3.2
5. Administrative discretion —4.0
Total —23.9
1. True Automatic Changes. As shown in the summary below,
over 80 per cent of the estimated automatic increase in the cash
deficit results from a decline in budget revenues..
Increase in Cash
Surplus (+) orDeficit (—)
Tyfeof Automatic Change (billions of dollars)
a. Decline in trust fund receipts —1.2
b. Rise in trust fund expenditures —2.5
c. Decline in budget receipts —15.7
d. Decline in budget expenditures
e. Increase in cash payments, not elsewhere classified —.4
Total —19.2
$23.9 billion greater than under conditions of an expanding econ-
omy.
a. Most of the change in trust fund receipts, taken as a whole,
results from reduced payroll tax collections, which are the
major source of receipts of these funds. With a decline in em-
ployment and in wages and salaries, "covered" payrolls would
decline, thus lowering tax collections, primarily in the old
age and survivors' insurance, railroad retirement, and unem-
ployment trust funds. A small decline would also occur in
the interest received on trust fund investments, since worsen-
ing economic conditions would reduce the amount available
for investment or—in the case of the unemployment trust fund
—necessitate the liquidation of investments to pay current
benefits.
b. The increase in trust fund expenditures consists almost entirely
of increased benefit payments from the social security trust
funds. These would occur because of the greater number of
persons who would be eligible and who could be expected
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to apply for benefits under existing laws. By far the largest
increase is in the unemployment trust fund.
c. Estimates of budget receipts were based on the President's
tax proposals of May 1953, which would rescind the reduc-
lions scheduled to occur April 1, 1954 in corporation income
taxes and in excise taxes.1 Since tax collections lag tax liabili-
ties, the full impact of the ecOnomic change is not apparent
in these estimates. Thus if economic conditions were to stabi-
lize at the assumed recession level, tax collections in the fiscal
year 1956 would be lower than in 1955. This is pointed out
because the corresponding 1955 estimate on the national in-
come and product basis is in terms of accruals (or liabilities)
and is substantially lower.
d. Most of the automatic decline in budget expenditures under
recession conditions is estimated to result from a slowdown
of deliveries of military goods, despite attempts that might
be made by the Department of Defense to keep military pro-
curement on schedule. Estimates of such a slowdown were
based on the assumption that most military contractors would
try to stretch out this federal contract work under recessionary
economic conditions so that they could maintain a nucleus
of key technical and skilled personnel and thus improve their
competitive position when civilian demand began to rise. This
assumption was made after lengthy discussions with govern-
ment experts in this field, but it is certainly debatable, since
any contractors pressed for cash might tend to speed up de-
liveries in order to receive final contract payments earlier.
e. The increase shown above for "cash payments not elsewhere
classified" consists largely of interest on redeemed savings bonds
and of redemptions of notes of the International Bank and
International Monetary Fund. Under recession assumptions it
is estimated that there would be a rise in cash redemptions
of savings bonds, particularly Series E bonds. As a result,
interest paid out would increase. The increased interest pay-
ments (but not the repayment of borrowing) are considered
cash expenditures. It is also expected that member nations
of the IMF would have balance of payment difficulties re-
quiring a greater supply of dollars, and we therefore estimated
1.Afterthis study was prepared Congress deferred the scheduled reduction in
corporation income taxes for one year. However, excise tax rates were reduced
(resulting in an estimated revenue loss of $1 billion) and the internal revenue
code was revised; these actions differed from the basic assumptions made in pre-
paring the revenue estimates for this study.EFFECTIVENESS OF BUDGET FLEXIBILITY
that there would be net redemptions of IMF notes of $300 mil-
lion under recession conditions, while no net redemption was
estimated under the expanding economy assumption.
2. Expenditure Changes from Supplemental Appropriations. The
programs included in this category are those in which a worsening
of economic conditions would cause increases in the number of
persons applying and qualifying for benefits under present law,
thereby raising the financial requirements of the programs in terms
of both benefit payments and administrative workloads. These
programs differ from the trust fund programs mentioned under
"true automatic changes" since appropriations for the latter are
"indefinite," the amount available depending on the program re-
quirements, while appropriations for the programs in this category
are enacted in specific amounts. To meet the increased financial
demands under the assumed recession, administrative and legis-
lative actions would be required to obtain supplemental appropria-
tions. Some time lag in obtaining the necessary actions might oc-
cur, but the supplemental appropriations would undoubtedly be
enacted because the funds required to meet the increased pro-
gram requirements are in effect legal and moral obligations of the
government.
Increase in Cash
Program or Agency Requiring Surplus (+) or Deficit (—)
SupplementalAppropriation (billions of dollars)
a.Veterans' compensation, pensions,unemployment
benefits, care, etc. —.9









a Lessthan $.1 billion.
a. Veterans', programs account for three-fourths of the estimated
increase in expenditures under supplemental appropriations.
The specific programs involved and the assumptions used are:
(1) education and training benefits are expected to rise because
the number of Korean veterans going to school would increase
with a decline in employment opportunities; (2) eligibility
under the compensation and pension program is determined
in part by the annual income of veterans or their dependents—
with declines in employment and income under recession con-
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ditions, the average number of newly eligible veterans would
be expected to rise and additional currently eligible veterans
would undoubtedly apply for benefits;(3) unemployment
compensation payments to Korean veterans would increase in
the event of an economic decline; and (4) expenditures for
the loan guarantee program would be expected to rise because
defaults on loans would increase under the assumed recession.
b. The increase estimated for drill pay is based on the expecta-
tion that attendance of reservists would rise' as employment
and income fell.
c. With increased unemployment, expenditures for public assist-
ance are also expected to rise.
d. Postal volume and postal revenue are estimated to fall some-
what faster than expenditures under recession conditions, thus
increasing the postal deficit—which must be met from general
revenues.
3. Expenditure Changes (Net) in Programs Financed by Public
Debt Authority. Programs in this category are financed through
enacted "authorizations to expend from public debt receipts" and
are mainly carried out by wholly owned government corporations.'
Because these programs are of a business character, regular appro-
priations have been considered too cumbersome and inefficient for
their ordinary operations. Therefore, the government agencies in-
volved are usually authorized to conduct their activities on a "re-
volving fund" basis—i.e. they may spend their operating receipts
as well as additional funds to the extent that their outstanding
liabilities at any one time do not exceed the amount of the avail-
able public debt authorizations. Such authorizations are usually
enacted in relatively large amounts, so that the agencies can carry
on their activities for several years without the necessity for re-
turning annually to Congress for additional funds. To the extent
that this is true, the net expenditure changes estimated are some-
what similar in nature to the "true automatic" changes already
discussed. They are grouped here, in a separate category, because
(1) the estimates are much more difficult to make than those in the
"true automatic" category and (2) there is some degree of ad-
ministrative discretion involved unless one assumes that present
program objectives are rigidly defined and will remain unchanged.
With changing economic conditions, changes would occur in the
various markets in which these government enterprises play a role.
The expenditure estimates, therefore, are based on a number of
95EFFECTIVENESS OF BUDGET FLEXIBILiTY
specialized assumptions and judgments about these markets. In
addition, they assume no change in present laws and program ob-
jectives.
Increase in Cash
Program or Agency Financed by Surplus (+) or Deficit (—)
PublicDebt Authorization (billions of dollars)
a. Federal National Mortgage Association —1.0
b. Agricultural price supports —.5
c. Export-Import Bank —.5
d. Low rent housing —.2
e. Defense Production Act —.2
f. Insurance of housing mortgages and savings and
loan deposits —.1
g. Reconstruction Finance Corporation —.1
h. Other —.1
Total —2.7
a. The Federal National Mortgage Association is authorized to
purchase FHA- and VA-insured mortgages of face value up
to $10,000 so long as the Association's total holdings do not
exceed $3,650 million.2 FNMA net expenditures reflect sales
and purchases of such mortgages plus earnings and repay-
ments. It was assumed that under recession conditions, private
lenders would be more reluctant to invest in mortgages and
that therefore the FNMA would be called upon to provide
mortgage funds necessary to meet housing demand not sup-
plied by the private market, and to encourage private mortgage
investment by providing a secondary market.
b. Expenditures by the Commodity Credit Corporation for
agricultural price supports (including the InteEnational Wheat•
Agreement) are determined by the level of price supports and
the factors affecting supply and demand for the commodities
under price supports. Assuming effective marketing quotas and
acreage allotments, it is estimated that expenditures of the
CCC would rise in a recession due to (1) a drop in cotton
exports, (2) an increase in the subsidization of wheat export
under the International Wheat Agreement, and (3) an increase
in expenditures for the support of nonbasic crops. However,
2Underthe Housing Act of 1954 enacted during the Eighty-third Congress,
second session (after this study was prepared), the FNMA is authorized to pur-
chase FHA- and VA-insured mortgages of face value up to $15,000 and the limit
on its total holdings has been changed.
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it should be pointed out that expenditure estimates for this
program are difficult to make under any
cThe Export-Import Bank is authorized to make loans to for-
eign countries in order to facilitate and assist the export and
import trade of the United States. Operating within its lend-
ing authority limit of $4.5 billion,4 the Export-Import Bank:
could expand its loan program in response to increased need
for funds by foreign countries in the event of a recession. In
addition, decreased repayments on loans now outstanding
might be expected. Thus net expenditures of the Bank might
be expected to increase substantially over the level assumed
in an expanding economy.
d. Most of the estimated net increase in expenditures for the
low rent housing program results from an assumed increase in
the ratio of government to private financing under recession
conditions.
e. The rise in net expenditures under the Defense Production
Act reflects increased purchases of aluminum, copper, titanium,
and other materials for the stockpile as private consumption
declines. Such purchases would, of course, be limited by stock-
pile objectives and the availability of funds.5
f. A recession could also be expected to produce additional de-
faults of mortgages insured by the government.
g. Net receipts of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation are
estimated to fall as the liquidation of RFC assets might be
hampered by the assumed economic recession.
4. Expenditure Change Due to Price Declines. Price declines
during the assumed recession would result in lower costs to the
government for many of the goods and services it purchases. Under
present law the President (through the Bureau of the Budget) may
establish budgetary reserves out of savings made possible after an
appropriation becomes available. It was assumed that the Presi-
dent (through the Bureau of the Budget) would place savings
New farm price support legislation, recently enacted by the Congress, is not
expected to affect expenditures until 1956.
This authority was increased by $500 million during the second session of the
Eighty-third Congress.
Since this paper was prepared, the President has approved a new long-term
stockpile policy, which is being reflected in additional procurement and stepped-
up deliveries for the stockpile. To finance increased procurement, a supplemental
appropriation of $380 million was approved by the Eighty-third Congress, second
session. These changes were not taken into account in the estimates presented
here.
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due to price declines in such reserves. Possible expansions of pro-
gram objectives through the use of these savings is included in the
next category, "administrative discretion."
Increase in Cash
Program or Agency Affected by ' Surplus(+) or Deficit (—)
PriceDeclines (billions of dollars)
a.Defense Department +2.4









Various grants to states




a. About three-quarters of the expenditure reductions due to
price declines are estimated to be in the Department of De-
fense, resulting in large part from the assumed declines in the
wholesale prices of metals, metal goods, and construction
materials. 'Costs of procurement of major equipment and
construction would be particularly affected.
b. In addition, it is estimated that expenditures for mutual se-
curity—representing in large part heavy (including military)
equipment—could drop considerably in the event of a re-
cession, as a result of declines in both foreign and domestic
prices.
c—f. Expenditures for other agencies and programs would be af-
fected, but to a smaller degree.
5.ExpenditureChanges through Administrative Discretion. The
estimates in this category are based largely on the following con-
siderations:(1) Congressional appropriations are sometimes en-
acted for one year, sometimes for two years, and sometimes with-
out any specific time limit; thus government agencies have some
discretion with respect to the speed with which they undertake
Program or Agency Affected by
Administrative Discretion
Increase in Cash




b.Mutual Security Program —2.8
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authorized programs and objectives. (2) The budgetary reserves
established because of price declines could be made available to
expand or expedite projects within the limits of the legislation au-
thorizing and financing the work, the feasibility of management
and administralion, and the objectives of the particular activity.
a. The estimated increase in Defense Department expenditures
results from an assumed administrative decision to initiate
construction of projects already authorized and funded, but
deferred because of general budgetary restrictions. An ex-
pansion would also be possible without additional appropria-
tions in the Defense Department's industrial mobilization pro-
gram, which provides for the building of additional plant
capacity.
b. The program for which the largest change is estimated as a
result of administrative discretionisthe Mutual Security
Program. For several years various factors have contributed
toward keeping expenditures for military assistance below
-previouslyagreed-upon objectives. These factors include the
imperfect availability of productive resources to meet pro-
gram goals, budgetary restrictions, and the inability of foreign
countries completely to absorb the military shipments (i.e. to
support operating and maintenance costs). With a worsening
of economic conditions, it would be reasonable to expect that
more productive resources would be available to meet exist-
ing program goals and that budgetary restrictions would be
eased, thus permitting a step-up in the foreign aid program
within available funds. In making our estimates for this pro-
gram, we assumed that the recipient countries would be able
to absorb the additional aid sent to them. It is possible, how-
ever, that this would not be the case and that our estimates of
increased expenditures are thereby overstated.
c—f. Discretionary expansions are possible in several other govern-
ment programs, but the amounts involved are substantially
smaller than in the Defense Department and the Mutual Se-
curity Program.
Almost all of the changes discussed above affect the budget sur-
plus or deficit as well as the cash surplus or deficit. Only three of
all the items mentioned do not affect the budget deficit. These
three are in the category of "true automatic" changes, and are (1)
trust fund receipts,(2) trust fund expenditures, and (3) cash
payments, n.e.c. Together, they were estimated to increase the cash
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deficit by $4.1 billion. Thus the increase in the budget deficit would
be $19.8 billion ($23.9 minus $4.1) from the assumed expanding
economy conditions to the assumed recession.
It is against the background of a deficit of this size that the p0-
litical feasibility of the $4 billion increase in expenditures through
administrative action (category 5) would be decided. There might
well be serious opposition to such an increase in federal expendi-
tures. On the other hand, pressing for increases would be the po-
litical, social, and economic effects of the unemployment that would
accompany the assumed recession. These same factors would also
influence the adoption of new legislation providing pump-priming
antirecession expenditures. We have made no estimate for any such
legislation.
CAPLAN, Washington, D.C.
My discussion will concentrate on what might loosely be called
the dynamics of the recession model from. which Lusher derived
his estimate of the coefficient of flexibility.' Clearly, the estimates
as to the effectiveness of budget flexibility are no better or, perhaps
more accurately, no worse than the reasonableness of the design of
the basic model. As a problem in methodology, model building has
great instructional merit, but we are primarily interested in its
heuristic value—that is to say, we are interested in the model not
as a dialectical exercise but as a guide to policy. Model maldng is
no longer a novel exercise. The model must depict a realistic con-
tingency that prudent policy makers should take into account.
In discussing the dynamics of this particular recession model, one
obvious approach is to consider the dynamics of the individual
assumptions, e.g. specific assumptions as to the behavior of wages
or prices, or investment, or consumption over the time period
postulated given the primary changes postulated. Equally obvious
are some of the points that can be made, e.g. that the rate of de-
cline in the individual variables would not take place in the even
fashion postulated. But such questions, while important, are not
basic unless it can be shown: (1) that the set of assumptions and
interrelationships isinternally inconsistent so that the model is
fundamentally self-contradictory and therefore meaningless, or
(2) that the degree of weakness postulated by the recession model
is unrealistic.
The views expressed here are solely the personal views of the writer.
1Themodel was the joint product of a group of economists.
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On the first point, those of us who prepared the model obviously
did not think it was self-contradictory. We believe it depicted a
possible situation in terms of assumed changes in the primary fac-
tors and historically reasonable interrelationships.
There was, however, vigorous debate in the group over the
second point: the realism or timeliness of such a model. The debate
was reminiscent of the one which raged over the ill-fated postwar
forecasts of a deflation. We, of course, have learned our lesson.
The model was not intended as a forecast. If, however, the model
is to help as a guide in formulating policy, the model should be
realistic in terms of current and foreseeable trends even though
it is not intended as a forecast. For this purpose no one would build
a model showing a decline of about the same magnitude as that
which occurred between 1929 and 1932. The arithmetic could be
done but it would be irrelevant for policy purposes. (Parentheti-
cally, I might add that the group prepared two other models: [1] of
a more moderate downturn, and {2] of an expanding economy.)
The realism, and therefore relevance, of the recession model is
important for another reason. As Cohn has pointed out, budget
flexibility is a function of the composition of the particular govern-
ment program in existence at a particular time. The effectiveness
of budget flexibility is geared to the kind of forces in operation at
the time it is needed, and the nature of the forces is partly depend-
ent upon the kind of budget flexibility available at the particular
time. There is a mutual interaction that is dependent on the his-
torical conjuncture. Hence it is important to determine whether,
with existing budget flexibility, it is still realistic to think in terms
of a possible 8 million unemployed.
The criticism of the relevance of the recession model has a three-
fold aspect: the historical position of the economy, the structural
problem, and the stabilizing influence of market forces and liquidity
factors. There is obvious overlap between these three categories but
it will aid the analysis to separate them.
On the first point, the historical position of the economy, the
argument runs along the following lines: The economy has been
enjoying virtually uninterrupted full employment since 1941. More
important, this has been true throughout the postwar period. In
such a situation some easing is possible—witness 1949 and the
current signs (1953). But the postwar momentum is still great—
investment intentions still remain high, consumption should remain
high, there is a scheduled decline in taxes, and any programed
decline in government spending will be moderate. Hence any de-
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dine in the economy at this stage would at worst be moderate and
in no event as serious as the decline postulated by the recession
model. Perhaps at some future time there will be a decline as
serious as that postulated, but not now.
On the second point, that dealing with structure, a number of
basic issues are raised: (1) High, relatively inflexible government
expenditures for goods and services are strengthening the economy.
In 1929 the ratio of such expenditures to gross national product was
about 8 per cent, in 1937 about 13 per cent, in 1952 about 22 per
cent, and in the first half of 1953 somewhat higher. We did not
have this tremendous anchor before the war, when most economists
would probably have predicted perpetual prosperity if the govern-
ment accounted for over 20 per cent of the GNP at levels of high
activity. Even with the estimated declines in programed federal ex-
penditures, their level would still be high. (2) The economy is
also being supported by built-in stabilizers such as revenue flexi-
bility, transfer payment flexibility, and the familiar list of supports:
deposit insurance, farm supports, FHA and VA mortgage insurance
(which also permits flexible downpayment requirements),etc.
(3) Many believe that psychological attitudes have changed,
that continuous high-level prosperity has bred behavior patterns
tilted toward higher minimum levels of investment and consumption
than in the past.(4) Stronger unions will be able to prevent
excessive cumulative downward price changes by maintaining
stickier wage rates than in the past.
The final point which the critics of the recession model make
deals with the strength of market forces and the influence
liquidity. These critics say that the market is strong because: com-
petitive development of new products is encouraging higher in-
vestment and higher consumption; firms are watching inventory-
sales ratios with greater care; moderate price reductions are prov-
ing effective in encouraging demand; the greater stickiness of wage
rates is increasing the pressures to cut costs by new techniques of
production.
In discussing the liquidity factor, some make great point of two
items: the high level of liquid assets in the hands of individuals and
business; and the expansion of such assets as a result of the substan-
tial deficits which will occur in a downturn, on the reasonable as-
sumption that monetary policy will then be geared to increasing
the economy's liquidity. The combination of these two items plus
the increase in real value of liquid assets resulting from some de-
cline in prices would tend to lower liquidity preference and to
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stimulate spending by both business and 'consumers. On the basis
of these factors, it is believed that endogenous stabilizing factors
will set in at an early enough stage of the downturn to prevent the
type of recession postulated by the model.
Thus, while it is realistic to expect some weakening—indeed, the
signs of such a weakening in economic activity are already clear—
the stabilizing forces are, it is contended, strong enough to limit
it to far less than 8 million unemployed and probably strong enough
to initiate an early reversal and a further resumption of expansion.
In all this we are, of course, abstracting from that exogenous
stabilizer, the Congress.
The list of potential stabilizing forces is indeed impressive, but
it would be a mistake to ignore the possibility depicted by the re-
cession model. I believe that the recession model is not an un-
reasonable possibility in the light of current forces. I detect too
much reliance in the discussions on the 1949 experience, which
was primarily an inventory readjustment. The present situation
appears to differ radically from that experience. For the first time
since the end of the war we are approaching a situation in which
several basic demand factors seem to be turning down simultane-
ously. These are: consumer demand for durables; plant and equip-
ment; residential housing; and government spending. Individually,
the changes appear quite small, but that could be only the first
impact. In addition, inventories are very substantial and could
quickly become out of line with some further weakening of sales.
Finally, we have had a very large increase in manufacturing ca-
pacity. The combination of all these factors adds up, in my opinion,
to a situation potentially more serious than 1949.
I have dwelt overlong on this debate for one major reason: it is
clear that the policies needed to combat a downturn must be geared
to the particular kind of downturn that may be coming. Of course,
insofar as we can improve our automatic stabilizers, so much the
better. But it seems clear to me that the trouble with them is that
they are ex post and not ex ante, and that if a downturn is sub-
stantial other specific policies will be necessary. We make a great
point of revenue flexibility, for example, but all it amounts to is that
when my income goes down, my taxes go down more than pro-
portionately but Istill have less income than before. Compared
with some worse system of taxation, I am better off, but that is not
my yardstick. I prefer to compare my position with where I was
when I was actually better off.
Since policies must be related to the character of the anticipated
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downturn, governments cannot avoid the frustrating experience of
having to appraise current and foreseeable trends. If, for example,
the recession model appears the more realistic, then government
policies stronger than those needed to deal with a moderate down-
turn will be called for. All this is obvious, but it is why I thought
it important to discuss the reasonableness of the recession model.
In all of this we must rely upon judgments, intention, and flair
as well as scraps of data. This is unsatisfactory, but I suppose that it
is the penalty we must pay for disobeying the commandments
enunciated by W. H. Auden: "Thou shalt not sit /Withstatisti-
cians nor commit /Asocial science." 2
COLM,Chief Economist, National Planning Association
David Lusher has done all of us a great service by suggesting a
precise formulation of what built-in stabilizers may mean in the
budget area and by following his concept through with computa-
tions.
What Do His Computations Tell Us? In case of a recession the
decline in GNP will be mitigated by 30 to 40 per cent because of
the stabilizing effect of revenues and expenditures of the federal
government and state and local governments. This means that the
actual decline in CNP will be 30 to 40 per cent less than it would
be without the stabilizing effect of the budgets. Under conditions
as they prevailed at the beginning of the depression of the thirties,
government budgets aggravated the downturn by 10 to 20 per
cent. What a stabilizing or aggravating effect is can best be seen
by stating what in Lusher's approach would be a neutral revenue
or expenditure system. If taxes and expenditures were to move
exactly in proportion with GNP they would have neither a stabi-
lizing nor an aggravating effect on the economy.
The fact that we had a 10 to 20 per cent aggravating effect in
1929—1930 and can expect a 30 to 40 per cent stabilizing effect
under the present tax and expenditure system is quite reassuring.
The only warning which must be. expressed is this: These per-
centages are calculated to the last decimal, but we don't know
what the 100 is to which these percentages refer. In other words,
we do not know what the total decline would be if government
expenditures and revenues were to fall in proportion to the drop
in GNP. Even if the decline were only 60 percent of what it would
2"UnderWhich Lyre, A Reactionary Tract for the Times," in his Nones,
Random House, 1939, P. 70.
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be without the built-in stabilizers, it could still be very discomfort-
ing. Half as big as big can still be very big!
We cannot apply these percentages to any of the current reces-
sion models because these are designed to take the stabilizing
effect of the budget into consideration.
What Are the Respective Contributions of Government Revenues
and Expenditures to the Stabilizing Effect of the Budget? Looking
at Lusher's figures in detail, it is surprising to see that the stabiliz-
ing effect of expenditures for goods and services is negligible com-
pared with that of revenue and transfer expenditures. It is .5 to 3 per
cent compared with a 30 to 33 per cent combined effect of revenue
and transfer expenditures.
This unexpected result occurs, I believe, because flexible ex-
pendftures for goods and services are defined in a particular way
in the budget study which Lusher used in his computations. If I
understand it correctly, those expenditure programs were regarded
as flexible in which a change of $10 million or more can be expected
in response to a change in business conditions. As someof these so-
defined expenditure flexibiities are up, and others are down (be-
cause of assumed price declines), their net stabilizing effect is
negligible. Lusher considers the stabilizing effect of "programed"
expenditures as a factor influencing economic conditions as they
would be without budget flexibility. This is an entirely possible
approach, but it in a treatment of expenditures different
from that used on the revenue side. It explains why Lusher's com-
putations show expenditures for goods and services to have only
a negligibly stabilizing effect.
Assume that government expenditures for goods and services
remain entirely stable measured in absolute dollars. Then their
proportion in a declining GNP would go up—they would be flexi-
ble if the same concept of flexibility were used that Lusher uses
with respect to revenue. If, for instance, expenditures for goods
and services of the federal government and state and local govern-
ments should remain stable at a level of $85 billion while private
expenditures contracted, they would make a very considerable
contribution to stabilization. Without going into the details of
computation it follows that approximately stable expenditures for
goods and services would contribute perhaps 20 to 25 per cent
to relative stability. Using a comparable approach for all elements
of the budget, it appears that revenues, transfer expenditures, and
expenditures for goods and services would make approximately the
same contribution to stability.
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Is Use of a Uniform Multiplier Justifiable for All Parts of the
Budget? Lusher's computations imply that every unit of budget
flexibility—whether taxes of various kinds, changes in transfer ex-
penditures, or changes in expenditures for goods and services—
has the same stabilizing effect. He knows, of course, that an in-
crease in unemployment benefit payments has probably a greater
relative effect than a reduction in profits taxes of the same amount.
It is entirely justifiable in a first approach to neglect these differential
effects. However, it is necessary to be aware of this simplification.
In a refinement of the study an attempt should be made to con-
sider the differential effect of various kinds of budget flexibility.
A. G. Columbia University.
The volume includes two papers on the measurement of "built-
in flexibility" in fiscal arrangements. But it still seems necessary to
ask why we want such measurements, and how our mode of meas-
urement can be linked to our objects.
Policy Context. The term "built-in flexibility" .hasa touch of
paradox. It aims to express the fact that the skillful introduction of
automatic-stabilizer characteristics into standing policy arrange-
ments is up to a point a substitute for policy flexibility.
I doubt that any serious advocates of built-in flexibility have
much hope of designing a policy that can make discretionary
stabilization measures superfluous in all conditions. We are talking
about arrangements that can reduce the amplitude of downswings
or inflationary upswings set up by uncontrolled forces elsewhere
in the economy (or by errors in discretionary policy!). In terms of
the categories used in R. A. Cordon's paper, such arrangements
may suffice in depressions where underlying investment oppor-
tunity is unimpaired. In such cases (as in 1949) the presence of
built-in flexibility can enable business to sell more than it produces
long enough to generate an inventory shortage—and without such
deep price cuts to move stocks threatened with obsolescence as to
make it impossible to move newly produced goods at remunerative
prices. But in more deep-seated depressions the most we can expect of
built-in flexibility is that it will limit the spread of depression from
itsoriginal focus and keep the depression tolerably mild long
enough so that some favorable development can pick us up—
whether it be good discretionary policy or good luck.'
1Extremeadvocates of price flexibility can reasonably claim that the monetary
effects of built-in flexibility in fiscal policy should reduce the amplitude of price
swings and (where they recognize such a thing) the time needed for prices to
flex sufficiently.
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I infer that we want essentially a measure of the ability of auto-
matic stabilizers to reduce the amplitude of fluctuations. The
question is whether to prefer measurements that are characteristics
of complex economic models• (involving a good deal in the way
of assumptions about behavior of various sectors of the economy),
or more naïve measurements that are more purely descriptions of
the fiscal sector.
Naïve Measurements. For many purposes we are best off with
measures that do not involve too many assumptions.2 Here we
want something that registers both the income elasticity of the
magnitude we are studying (tax liability, or unemployment com-
pensation, or whatever it may be) and also its large or small size
relative to the total economy.
Mindful of the amplitude-reducing function of built-in flexibility,
we can have recourse to what I hint at in Money, Debt and Eco-
nomic Activity:a coefficient that measures the extent to which the
arrangement in question shifts the government budget toward def-
icit. For each arrangement we can set up a fraction of the di-
mensions
Dollar increment of deficit
Dollar increment of GNP
and these fractions can be added up.
This type of measurement leads to an argument a fortiori. If the
fractions add up to .35 (to illustrate with a figure which seems to
me of the right order of magnitude), this implies that investment
can drop relative to saving by $3.5 billion without carrying GNP
down by over $10 billion. Another way to put this is to take the
reciprocal of .35 (that is, 2.86) as a multiplier, and say that a given
drop in investment will not reduce GNP by more than 2.86 times the
drop in investment. Implicitly, we assume that a drop of GNP will
lower or at least not raise private saving.
Estimating Components of the Naïve Measurement. The worst
of the problems of gauging built-in flexibility are evaded by this
technique of naïve measurement. But serious difficulties remain. A
few notes on the main components will map these difficulties.
Personal income tax: Joseph Pechman's estimates rely on time
series analysis (see paper following). He shows clearly that the only
aspect of progression markedly affecting the outcome is the jump
2still shiver over the reaction of the Congressman who wanted to know
"whether a revenue estimate was based on assumptions, because if so, I don't be-
lieve it"! Obviously, without assumptions we can reach no conclusions; yet we
must prefer estimates whose assumptions seem to the layman.
Second edition, Prentice, Hall, 1953, p. 462.
107EFFECTIVENESS OF BUDGET FLEXIBILITY
from a zero rate on income covered by exemption to 20 per cent or
so on surtax net income. We may agree with Pechman that tax
liability works out much as if a flat tax applied to surtax net income
—at 1954 rates, about 24 per cent. On historical grounds we may
take it that adjusted gross income is a fairly uniform proportion of
GNP—around 70 per cent.4 But the relation of surtax net income to
adjusted gross income is open to argument, and it. must be analyzed
in terms of the structure of the tax base. Pechman's marginal co-
efficient of .6 to .7 for the proportion of variations in adjusted gross
income that will show up in surtax net income seems too low from
his own data if we allow for population On the other hand,
to get this marginal coefficient as high as .7, we must apparently
assume a larger relative variation in the incomes of those who re-
main taxable throughout an income fluctuation than in the incomes
of those who are not taxable at all or are taxable only part of the
time.° If we call the coefficient .69, the marginal relation of the
tax to GNP is (.24) (.7) (.69), or about .116 (±.01).
Most estimates of the built-in flexibility of this tax run in terms
of annual data. I have tried to use Department of Commerce quar-
terly figures on personal income and tax liability, with inconclusive
4Applyingsuch a uniform proportion, however, implies that the sum of in-
direct taxes, corporate taxes, and corporate savings—less government transfers and
interest—is also a uniform proportion of GNP—an assumption which cannot fit
situations where drastic reshaping of the tax structure is considered.
We want to compare alternative situations that might exist at a given date
(population constant). If we reduce Pechrnan's figures for adjusted gross income
and surtax net income at 1953 exemptions and deductions (Table 4) to a per
capita basis, and then take the increments, the ratio of increase in Surtax net
income to increase in adjusted gross income in Table 5 will range from .64 to .80
instead of from .61 to .68, the 1946—1953 over-all change shows a ratio of .70
instead of .68, and the 1948—1949 decrease shows a ratio of .74 instead of 1.20.
6 maylook at taxpayers in two groups. A group that is pretty sure to remain
taxable can be marked off by using the data for adjusted gross income (AG!)
and exemptions by marital status and sex for taxable returns covering the 1950
tax year (Treasury Press Service Release H-266, October 8, 1953, Table 3). In
each status-and-sex group we can mark off the income classes for which AG!
was at least double the exemptions. The group of taxpayers so defined reported
.680 of all ACT, and with rough allowance for deductions seem to have enjoyed
.87 of all surtax net income. On a slump of income the exemptions and itcmized
deductions would be unimpaired. Their standard (presumptive) deductions
averaged about 6 per cent of their AC!. Since their AG! must slump by some 43
per cent to render them nontaxable, we may suppose that for moderate fluctua-
tions of income their surtax net income (SNI) will vary by about 94 per cent of
the variation in theft AGI. If their AGI varies in proportion to total ACT. there-
fore. their SN! will fall by about .64 (i.e. .94 X of the fall in AG!. The SN!
of the remaining taxpayers amounts to.only about 6 per cent of AG!, so that if
most of it is wired out. a general slump of AG! will reduce SN! by a trifle less
than .70 of the fall in AGI.
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results.7 Quarterly data on withholding in relation to civilian wages
and salaries seem to offer better holding ground, since we are able
to adjust for changes in withholding rates and blow the receipts up
into a withholding tax base by quarters since the spring of 1948.
But here again the shape of the figures is not very illuminating—
presumably largely because of difficulties in timing adjustments.8
It should be noted, however, that if we blow up Statistics of Income
figures on the amount of tax withheld each year, we find a with-
holding base equal to over 90 per cent of surtax net income for
most years. In short, almost all of the built-in flexibility of the in-
come tax is reflected in withholding and may be presumed to take
hold currently.9
For the corporation tax we are probably well advised to ignore
the progression of the tax at low levels of corporate income and to
treat it (after the termination of the excess profits tax) as a flat
rate on corporate profit. The prosperity level of corporate profit, in
a noninflationary situation, may be put at .12 (±.O1) of GNP. But
the marginal relation to GNP depends on the situation in view.
In Gordon's frame of reference a short slump arising in business
policy toward orders and inventories, for example, implies allow-
• ance at the trough for the tax effects of inventory losses. On the
other hand, if we got into a stabilized depression because of a flag-
ging of investment opportunity, we would want to compare profits
not much affected by inventory losses with prosperity profits. For
On a seasonally adjusted basis the Commerce figures show a decline of per-
sonal tax liabilities from the last half of 1948 to the last half of 1949amounting
•to about one-fifth of the $6.3 billion decline in the average level of GNP. On a
seasonally unadjusted basis, however Commerce shows no drop in personal
taxes between these two half years. Similar oddities appear for other periods we
might compare.
8Thedates, when withheld taxes enter the Treasury Daily Statement (or the
Internal Revenue reports) are not tidily related to the dates of withholding. Treas-
ury reports funds as they reach Treasury depositories—largely in the month of
withholding, but with a lag of one to three months for amounts withheld by
smaller employers. The Bureau of Internal Revenue reports funds as the Bureau
gets checks or deposit receipts for sums placed earlier in Treasury deposi-
tories.
On the whole a two-month lag of collections behind withholding seems the
best simple adjustment. But on this basis, if we blow up receipts to a withholding
base and subtract from civilian wages and salaries, we get a residue (approxima-
tion to withholding exemptions) which as late as early 1952 shows no growth
over 1948! There are also some suspicious quarter-to-quarter jumps. The drop
from the second half of 1948 to the second half of 1949 in civilian wages and
salaries fails to show up in the withholding-base series.
The timing of effects depends significantly on the time of year at which
incomes slump, in view of the concentration of tax refunds in February through
May of the ensuing year.
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the first problem I would be inclined to put the marginal propensity
of profits to slump at about .3 of any fluctuation in GNP, suggesting
a tax-flexibility coefficient of, say, .135 ± .015. For the second I
would be inclined to put the marginal propensity of profits to slump
at .2, suggesting a tax-flexibility coefficient of .09 ± .01.
With unemployment compensation, again, the type of fluctuation
affects the outcome. A fall in insured payrolls is likely to approxi-
mate half of any fall in GNP. But if the fall in payrolls represents
reduced hours of work, it will lead to virtually no unemployment
compensation; while if it represents layoffs with working hours of
those still on the payroll little affected, compensation will be sub-
stantial. If we want a single-valued coefficient, we must give it a
wide margin of error—say, .065 ± .020. By good fortune, this source
of error is partly hedged by an offsetting error in estimating per-
sonal income taxes.1° Social security contributions run around .025
of GNP and may be assigned a marginal coefficient of .025.
Commodity taxes may be assigned an income elasticity on GNP
of around .8 (about half that of the personal income tax); property
taxes and the like, an income elasticity for short fluctuations close
to zero. For taxes other than income taxes, taken as a whole, we
may write a flexibility coefficient on GNP of about .06 ± .01. While
the built-in flexibility of government outlays seems doubtful, we may
add up these coefficients for the whole fiscal system:
Personal income tax .116 ± .010
Corporate tax .090 ± .010
Unemployment compensation .065 ± .020
Social security contributions.025 ± .002
Commodity taxes .060 ± .010
Sum of coefficients .356 ± .052
In view of offsetting errors, we may write .36 ± .04. For an inven-
tory fluctuation we would write .40 ± .04.
Full-Model Estimates. A more interesting but less secure way of
estimating built-in flexibility is to think of fiscal instruments as
part of a general equilibrium model, and to ask how much of the
prospective amplitude of a fluctuation would be removed by a given
policy change. This view is essentially relative; it would yield, for
example:
10Inthe case where unemployment takes the form of short hours, most of the
reduction of pay will come out of the withholding base and SNI; so that the
contingency that points to the lower limit of the estimation range for unemploy-
ment compensation points to the upper limit for the personal tax.
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Alternatively, it can be looked at as a comparison of Keynesian mul-
tipliers (treated as derived magnitudes rather than assumptions)
under two policy setups. The setup with the lower multiplier has the
higher built-in flexibility (greater stability in face of a disturbance).
This way of looking at things calls for explicit assumptions about
two main problems—saving patterns and tax shifting—on which
economists cannot feel too confident. I have amused myself, for
all that, by setting up three illustrative models bearing on the
income tax—sales tax comparison. In Model A, I assume roughly
present taxes; in Model B, I assume the personal income tax to be
replaced by a sales tax 100 per cent shifted to consumers; in Model
C, I assume the personal income tax to be replaced by a sales tax
absorbed 100 per cent by corporate and unincorporated profits.
Model A yields a multiplier of 1.84, ModelS B a multiplier of 2.09,
Model C a multiplier of 2.24. A comparison works out as follows:
Model A B C
Multiplier 1.84 2.09 2.24
Forecast level of output (per cent of full employ-
ment GNP) if investment falls 10 per cent of full
employment CNP 81.7%79.2%77.6%
Index: ratio of slump under Model C to slump un-
der model in question 1.22 1.08 1.00
MELVIN I. WHITE, Brooklyn College
A procedure like that developed by Musgrave-Miller and Lusher
seems to me indispensable to any attempt at assessing the automatic
contribution of alternative fiscal structures to economic stabilization.
By making the fiscal structure—characterized by the income elastici-
ties of its components—an explicit variable in an income determi-
nation model, the effects of changes in the fiscal structure on other
variables can be isolated. The Musgrave and Lusher measures of the
contribution of automatic, or "built-in," flexibility isolate the ef-
fects on aggregate income, given a fixed decline in autonomous ex-
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penditures and assuming constant consumption and business savings
functions.1
I think, however, that the use of declines in aggregate income as
the measuring (or dependent) variable does not yield the coefficient
that is always the most useful for policy purposes. Certainly if there
is any stabilization goal on which there is professional and lay con-
sensus, it is that some policy must be adopted to prevent aggregate
income from ever falling below a figure that is within a moderate
range of the full employment level. Formulating the stabilization
goal in this way implies that if built-in flexibility alone is sufficient
to maintain aggregate income at or above the "floor" level, no
other immediate fiscal action will be required. But if it is not, then
supplementary action to offset or reduce the decline in auton-
omous expenditures will be necessary—such asdeliberateex-
pansion of public works, tax rate reduction in the low income brack-
ets to stimulate consumption, etc. Thus in evaluating the effective-
ness of the flexibility built into alternative fiscal structures, the
relevant question may frequently not be how much aggregate in-
come will fall in response to a given decline in autonomous ex-
penditures, but rather how much supplementary action will be
required to maintain an acceptable floor under aggregate income.
This suggests that the effectiveness of built-in flexibility be measured
in terms of the maximum decline in autonomous expenditures that
ultimately can be permitted, given an acceptable maximum decline
in aggregate income from an initial level.
Specifically, as an alternate to Lusher's coefficient, I propose the
following measure, which can be identified as F:
F=Ml_A2)_(k —A12)
(A1A12)
A, autonomous expenditures, is equal to the sum of Lusher's I + G.
(A1A2) is the maximum drop in autonomous expenditures con-
sistent with a decline in gross national expenditures from their ini-
tial level, Y1, to the floor level Y2. (Since Y., is set in relation to the
1Actually,of course, their coefficients refer directly only to the differential re-
suits of shifting between a given structure and a hypothetical one. As Lusher
points out, the hypothetical system in and of itself is of significance mainly as a
bench-mark, and therefore it is the comparison of coefficients for the prevailing
structure and for proposed modifications that will be of practical interest.
It is true that zero elasticity implies perverse changes in effective tax rates,
which may be too unrealistic even for a bench-mark, except perhaps for excises.
However, it may be noted that the bench-mark which Lusher has used, unit
elasticity, implies that transfer payments and the flexible component of govern-
ment expenditures are actually reduced when income falls.
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full employment income, it would rise secularly as the full employ-
ment output of the economy expanded.) (A1 —A12)is the maxi-
mum hypothetical drop in autonomous expenditures consistent with
the decline in gross national expenditures from Y1 to Y2but with
the bench-mark fiscal structure assumed in effect. Thus the expres-
sion F represents the percentage additional decline in autonomous
expenditures that can be permitted under the actual fiscal structure
over that permitted under the bench-mark structure.





Defining elasticity in the usual fashion;
ER = . or= ERr1
similarly,
= ETt1 and=E0g1
(ET and E0 normally being negative).
The actual decline in autonomous expenditures can then be ex-
pressed 'as:
(3) (A1 —A2)=(Y1—Y2)(1 —c+cs+ cE.nr1 —CETt1—Ecg1)
The hypothetical decline in A can be given either by setting the
E's equal to zero, as in the Musgrave-Miller bench-mark:
(4) (Al—A12)M=(Y1—Y2)(1—c+cs)
or by setting the E's equal to one, following Lusher:
(5)(Al—A12)L= (Y1—Y2)(1—c+cs+cr1—ct1—g1)




2Forcomparison, reference can be made to Lusher's equations 6and 9, re-
calling that, for those equations, T, G, andare not independently defined
variables. For comparison with Lusher's first formulation, his equation 11, my
expression can be reduced to:
— —
(Y1—Y2)(Il+a— cd)
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or
7
—cr1(ER—1) —ct1(ET—1) — —1)
() 1—c+cs+cr1—ct1—g1
Either of the final forms of' F would vanish should the elasticities
of the actual structure reach the values of the respective bench-mark
elasticities. The value of F varies directly with the effective rates at
the initial level of income and with the degree of elasticity in the
fiscal structure—the latter, of course, being greater the larger the
figure for ER is and the larger the negative figures for ET and E0
are.
The relative advantage (or disadvantage) of any contemplated
modification of the prevailing fiscal structure, so far as built-in flexi-
bility is concerned, can be given by the formula
1
whereis the coefficient for the prevailing structure and Fm the
coefficient for the structure after modification. For example, if the
prevailing structure has a coefficient of .30 and the suggested moth-
fications would result in a coefficient of .43, then the modification
would increase the permissible decline in autonomous expenditures
by 10 per cent. Thus the coefficient can be construed—perhaps more
than Lusher's—as measuring the relative built-in capacities
of fiscal structures to offset the declines in autonomous expenditures.
It can be noted that for policy-making purposes, when absolute
magnitudes—_current and anticipated—are of immediate interest,
equation S may become more useful than equations 6 and 7. If a
decline, say, in autonomous private investment were anticipated for
a forthcoming year, the difference between the amount of the antici-
pated decline and the expression (A1 —A2)indicates directly the
amount of offsetting expansion of autonomous government expendi-
tures, or of induced rise in consumption resulting from tax reduction,
that would be necessary to maintain the "floor" level under aggregate
income.
C. KAHN, National Bureau of Economic Research
Lusher's discussion raises a question as to the meaning of his
coefficients. His method of measuring the stabilizing flexibility of
budget revenues and expenditures against an assumed bench-mark
brings up the problem of when changes in the government budget
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are stabilizing and when not. No objection can, of course, be raised
against the use of a bench-mark per Se. It is only when this bench-
mark is taken as the dividing line between what is stabilizing and
what is destabilizing, or "perverse," that there arises ground for con-
cern.
Lusher's coefficient of flexibility, wouldindicate a neutral
budget when the average rates of taxation and government expendi-
tures relative to the gross national product each remain constant. If
his coefikient, hasa positive value it merely indicates that the
ratio of government expenditures to gross national product rose
and/or the ratio of revenues to gross national product fell. What
we have, then, is an assumption that the effect of governments'
budgets on gross nationaiproduct is neutral if the absolute amounts
of both expenditures and taxes fall in proportion to the national
product. This implies that any budget deficit will decline in size as
gross national product declines. An initially balanced budget will
be balanced at a lower level after the decline in gross national
product. However, unless specific assumptions as to the behavior
of investment have been made and unless government expenditures
are assumed to consist entirely of transfer expenditures, considera-
tions arising from the balanced-budget theorem suggest that an
equivalent fall in government expenditures and taxes, such as oc-
curs under the proportional tax-expenditure system used as a bench-
mark by Lusher, is not neutral in its effect on the level of gross na-
tional product. Even when Lusher'shas a positive value it does
not rule out a declining level of government expenditures and a
declining deficit.
To repeat, it is not my intention to question the use of a bench-
mark and the logic underlying the coefficients derived therefrom.
I believe, however, that Lusher's coefficients may lend themselves
to misinterpretation, and I am concerned because Lusher himself
appears to have taken his bench-mark to be the dividing line be-
tween stabilizing and destabilizing budget effects.
DANIEL M. HOLLAND, National Bureau of Economic Research
I am not sure that Lusher's claim that "Though the figures are
stilltentative, their general magnitudes are probably accurate
enough to permit evaluations" can be strongly put forward. In par-
ticular, I find difficulty in evaluating thefound for the corporation
income tax.
One of Lusher's most startling findings is the very high coefficient
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of stabilizing effectiveness of the federal corporation income tax.
In every period of the hypothetical recession the corporation income
tax has a stabilizing effectiveness at least twice as great as the
federal personal income tax. This is an important conclusion, and
one that is not completely expected. How firmly can it be held?
As I understand his procedure, Lusher measures the stabilizing
effectiveness of the components of our revenue system by applying
the same c(marginalrate of change in consumers' expenditures
relative to disposable income) to each component of the tax system.
The use of this technique means that the greater stabilizing effec-
tiveness of the corporate income tax as compared with the personal
income tax is to be found in greater rate flexibility of the former.
But, as Richard Goode points out elsewhere in this volume, "The
reasoning that equates built-in flexibility of tax yield with automatic
stabilization does not seem to be fully applicable to the corporate
income tax. The identification is justifiable for the individual income
tax on the plausible assumption that consumer expenditures ordi-
narily respond promptly to changes in disposable income. An
analogous assumption regarding business investment is not admis-
sible." Therefore, before we accept Lusher's finding on the relative
stabilizing effectiveness of the corporation income tax, we must be
convinced that it is reasonable to apply the same ctochanges in
the effective rate of corporate taxation (tax revenue related to gross
national income) that is applied to other components of the tax
system.
Setting aside this difficulty about the appropriate c,anotherprob-
lem remains. In pursuing this I have experimented a little with
some of the findings presented to this conference.
Pechman finds that the built-in flexibility of the individual in-
come tax base in terms of total adjusted gross income is .65 and the
marginal tax rate is about .27. If total adjusted gross income runs
at about .7 of GNP (the figure suggested by Hart), then for every
$10 billion decline in GNP, personal income tax revenue will fall
by $1.28 billion.
A set of arbitrary but currently reasonable figures for the rele-
vant variables would include GNP of $870 billion, personal tax
collections of $30 billion, and corporate tax collections of $20 bil-
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For the corporate income tax to have atwice as great as this, its
have to be .002328. Therefore, corporate income tax collec-
tions will have to fall by $1.38 billion. (These figures conform fairly
well with Lusher's model. With the corporate tax at 52 per cent, a
decline in tax liability of $1.38 billion implies a fall of $2.65 billion
in corporate profits. Lusher's model assumes that "Corporate profits
plus inventory valuation adjustment ... movewith the private
nonfarm gross national product, at a marginal rate of roughly one-
fourth.")
When it comes to evaluating the meaning ofIam a little puz-
zled. Does it seem reasonable to conclude that a tax which "re-
leases" $1.38 billion has twice the stabilizing effectiveness of a tax
which "releases" $1.23 billions? How shall we, then, in concrete
terms, evaluate the meaning of 4,?
CHARLES L. ScmJi.l'zE
In the last few paragraphs of his comment Holland presents a
paradox apparently resulting from the relative (flexibility co-
efficients) calculated by Lusher for the corporate and personal tax
structure.
Assuming a $370 billion GNP, $30 billion in personal taxes, and
$20 billion in corporate taxes, Holland then calculates the change in
personal taxes attendant upon a $10 billion decline in GNP. This is




Since Lusher calculates a corporate taxroughly twice as large as
the personal taxthecorporatewould also have to be twice as
great, i.e. .002328, and the decline in corporate taxes $1.38 billion;
20—18.62= .002328 (see footnote 1)
Holland then asks how the stabilizing effectiveness of a tax
which "releases" $1.38 billion can be twice as great as that of a
tax which "releases" $1.23 billion.
This apparent paradox is easily resolved when it is remembered
that Lusber's .4, measures flexibility of the "actual" system relative
to a "zero flexibility" system in which all are zero as GNP
'This checks out well with Lusher's model, which assumes a 52 per cent
corporate tax rate and roughly a 25 per cent marginal rate of profits on GNP.
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changes. Thus the relativeof two taxes are measures of the
relative release of funds in the actual system (Lusher's Y1 and Y2)
compared with the release which would have occurred in a zero
flexibility system (Lusher's Y12).
This can be shown from Holland's figures:






personal taxes, —= $.42billion





corporate taxes, Y12 —= $.84billion
Thus the release of corporate taxes in the "actual" system (Y1,
Y2) is $.84 billion greater than in the "zero flexibility" system
while the release of personal taxes in the "actual" system is $.42
billion greater than in the "zero flexibility" system. Hence, measured
not in terms of their actual movements, but rather in terms of their
difference from a hypothetical zero flexibility case, corporate taxes
release twice as much in funds as personal taxes.
Earlier in his comment Holland questions the large 4) for corpo-
rate taxes on the grounds that Lusher's model implies that corpo-.
rate tax reductions have the same effect in stimulating expenditures
as do personal tax reductions. He also quotes Goode on the same
point.
Again remembering that Lusher'smeasures flexibility relative
to a system in which all sr's are zero as GNP changes, there is
ample justification for his treatment of corporate tax reductions,
given his model.
The corporate profit function in Lusher's model postulates a
marginal rate of corporate profits on GNP greater than the average
rate; i.e corporate profits = Cl? = m + nY, with m being a negative
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constant. In the "actuar' system, corporate tax rates are constant and
corporate taxes =R(m+ nY). However, the zero flexibility system
is defined as one in which(r being measured in this case against
Y) equals zero with changes in 1'. Hence corporate taxes in Y12 =
p+ R(m + nfl and p must be a positive constant equal to Rm
so that p ±Rm=0;corporate taxes equal RnY; and the average
rate of corporate taxes on GNP is thus constant. With a positive
constant in the corporate tax equation we get a regressive corporate
tax structure. As GNP declines in the Y12 system the greater. than
average fall in corporate profits is offset by an increasing ayerage
effective corporate tax rate resulting in a constant corporate tax
yield relative to GNP.
However, in Lusher's set of equations the function for business
saving is the same for both the "actual" and the "zero flexibility"
systems, i.e. b +sY.Hence a different corporate tax function in the
two systems is added to a business savings function which is the
same in both systems, indicating that corporate profits before taxes
in the two systems are different,2 i.e. the m and n of the Y1, Y2
system are different from the m and n of the Y12 system.
The difference in corporate taxes between the two systems is
thus seen to turn up in personal income and has the same effect as
a difference in personal taxes in terms of its effect on consumption.
Lusher has measured the flexibility contribution of corporate taxes
by assuming that the difference between the actual corporate tax
rate and the one implicit in a zero flexibility system would be re-
flected in a difference in profits before taxes and not in business sav-
ings. The validity of this thesis rests, of course, on the incidence of
corporate taxes, with Lusher's equations postulating that, as between
the two systems, the different rates of change in corporate tax yields
with respect to changes in CNP are reflected in different rates of
change in personal income with respect to changes in GNP.
REPLY BY HOLLAND
I did not intend to imply that Lusher was incorrect within the
context of his model. I hoped to elicit a more explicit and developed
explanation of why this particular method of measuring stabilizing
effectiveness was chosen in preference to and to the exclusion of
others.
It still seems to me that in evaluating the stabilizing effectiveness
2Weleave out the treatment of dividends for the sake of simplicity. Their
inclusion would not alter the results.
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of a tax the absolute amount by which it "buttresses" spending is
a very relevant consideration, and one on which a set of relative
rankings could be based. In these terms, with taxes ranked on the
basis of their total stabilization effect rather than their stabilization
effect relative to the proportional tax system bench-mark, the stabi-
lizing effectiveness of the corporate and personal income taxes
would not be as divergent as in Lusher's paper.
Something has been left out ofmakingit, in a sense, too re-
fined. One salient piece of information—the relative importance
of each tax in the revenue structure—is to some extent obscured,
becausedeals only with offsets over and above those that a pro-
portional tax system would provide. It is equally important to know
how much of a given decline in GNP actually would be curtailed
by each component of the tax system. The value for each tax would
then be a function both of its flexibility of yield and its absolute
size. In other words, is it not important to know that, given the
contours of Lusher's model, in absolute terms the personal and
corporate income taxes have just about the same strength in cushion-
ing a potential decline in GNP? The greater revenue flexibility of
the corporate tax is counterbalanced by the larger absolute amount
of personal income tax.
Some special features of Lusher's model apparently help to ac-
count for the relatively high stabilizing effectiveness of the cor-
poration income tax. For one thing, as Schultze points out, the
"proportional" (with respect to GNP) tax system requires the un-
likely (the adjective is mine) condition of a corporate tax struc-
ture regressive in relation to its own base. In the "actuar' system,
on the other hand, the corporate tax is proportional with respect to
its own base. Therefore, is not the result in the "actual", system
compared with an unreal base, and is not some of the strength
of theof the corporation income tax explained by the fact that
a proportional tax is contrasted with a regressive levy? The par-
ticular bench-mark chosen imparts unjustified vigor to the cor-
porate tax's 4).
How• is it that "The difference in corporate taxes between the
two systems is thus seen to turn up in personal income and [have]
the same effect as a difference in personal taxes in terms of its
effect on consumption"? Schultze, in correspondence with me, has
elaborated on the possibilities in this connection. As he explains
it: "Undistributed corporate profits before tax (i.e. corporate profits
before tax minus dividends) are different in his two systems pre-
cisely by the amount of corporate taxes. Personal income is sta-
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tistically equal to GNP minus certain deductions, one of which, in
Lusher's system, is corporate undistributed profits before tax.Since
the decline in corporate undistributed profits after taxisthe
same in the actual as in the bench-mark system, and the cor-
porate tax decline is greater in the actual than in the bench-mark
system, the difference in tax declines shows up as a difference in
the decline in corporate profits before tax (i.e. profits before tax de-
cline less in the bench-mark system than in the actual system).
This in turn means that personal income relative to GNP declines
more in the bench-mark than in the actual system. This may be
worked out in one or a combination of four ways (at least): (1)
Wage rate changes may be different in the actual relative to the
bench-mark system (rise more or fall less); (2) price changes may
be different as between the two systems; (8) dividend changes may
differ between the two systems; or (4) employers may be more
willing to hold on to their labor force temporarily in the case of
the actual system and its greater tax decline."
These various possibilities all imply something about corporate
tax incidence. For example, (1) assumes the tax is shifted back-
ward to the suppliers of services; (2) follows if the tax is shifted
forward; and (4) implies, apparently, that the corporation income
tax rests solely on distributed earnings. All these incidence assump-
tions are, of course, supportable. But what is probably the most valid
assumption, particularly in the short run—that the incidence of the
corporation income tax is primarily on profits—is not found in this
list,' because it is ruled out by the postulated equality of after-tax
corporate savings in the two systems. But if we take the incidence
of the corporation tax to be (in whole or in part) on profits, then
both dividends and retained earnings would be affected. In the
case discussed by Schultze both wOuld be higher in the "actual"
then in the "proportional" system, so personal income in the "actual"
system would not exceed personal income in the "proportional"
bench-mark by as much as model would have it.
It appears, then, that the failure to fit into the model what is
probably the most widely accepted view of the incidence of the
corporation income tax, is part of the explanation of its relatively
highOrto put it somewhat differently, as long as the incidence
1RichardB. Goode, who has devoted considerable time to this problem,
recognizing that in view of all the complexities an unqualified answer is impos-
sible, nonetheless concludes that "For both analytical and policy purposes, the
most important conclusion is that the initial or short-run incidence is largely on
corporate profits." Richard B. Goode, The Corporation Income Tax, Wiley, 1951,
p. 72.
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of the corporation income tax is to some degree on retained earn-
ings, then the corporate tax'sfrom Lusher's model is too high.
I would like to conclude on a note of agreement. A number of
letters have passed between Schultze and myself, in the course
of which some common ground has emerged. He has summarized
the points on which we both agree as follows:
"1. The 'm's' calculated by Mr. Lusher result from a comparison
of income-generated tax yield changes in the 'actual' economic sys-
tem with tax yield changes in a 'bench-mark' system where all taxes
are proportional to GNP.
"2. The largeforcorporate taxes results from two features of
Mr. Lusher's model.
(a) He is comparing the actual corporate tax structure (taxes
roughly proportional to profits) with a bench-mark system
in which corporate taxes are regressive on profits (but pro-
portional to GNP).
(b) An income-generated decline in corporate tax yields in the
actual system is therefore relatively larger than a similarly
generated decline in the bench-mark system. The difference
between the two declines is reflected in a relative difference
in personal income between the two systems.
"3. With respect to the incidence of corporate taxes this implies
that• differing marginal rates of corporate taxes lead to differing
marginal rates of personal income relative to GNP, rather than to
differing marginal rates of after-taxprofitsrelative to CNP."
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